ADVERTISEMENT

The following Address* was sent to America, within a few days after its date, with orders to have it published, but for reasons, which the circumstances, and temper of the times suggested, the publications was deferred, and I know not if it has as yet been made public in the United States; but my silence, on this subject, has been construed so much to my disadvantage, that I cannot in justice to myself, any longer delay that vindication of my conduct, whilst in the service of my country, which has been so long expected from me.

*The manuscript copy of the Address was sent to America by Deane’s son, with a request, dated Nov. 3, 1783, that his brother Barnabas should have it printed. It consisted of the Address dated Aug. 10, 1783, with a postscript and appendix dated Oct. 12, 1783. It was printed at Hartford by Hudson & Goodwin, in 1784, in an octavo pamphlet of 30 pages, entitled “An Address to the Free and Independent Citizens of the United States of North America. By Silas Deane, Esquire.” The London edition of 1784, an octavo of ninety-five pages, is herewith reproduced. It contains Deane’s later corrections. In this edition alterations were made in the Address dated Aug. 10th; the appendix dated Oct. 12 was omitted, and a new appendix arranged, to which was added the letter to Robert Morris. It was reprinted at New London the same year, in a quarto of thirty-eight pages.

To The
Free and Independent Citizens
Of The
United States
Of
North-America

Friends, and Fellow Citizens,

The happy period being arrived, in which we may, in peace, take a review of the scenes through which we have passed, and with calmness and impartiality examine and judge of past transactions, I am encouraged to come forward, and to address you on a subject of infinite importance to myself, and of so much to you, as to excuse me from the making any previous apology on the occasion; -perhaps I ought rather to make one for my having been so long silent, under the many heavy charges brought against me, in the public papers, in America. –Neither a want of sufficient means to refute them, or any indifference as to the opinion of my countrymen, occasioned my silence; but the reflection, that during the rage and violence of war, and whilst party prejudices, heats, and jealousies, were in their full force, it was by no means the time for a cool and dispassionate discussion of any subject on which, appearances had already prejudiced the minds of the public.

I therefore resolved to wait, and to improve the first moment of public peace and tranquility, to appear, and to plead my cause at your bar; during near three years of misfortunes, and exile, I have impatiently looked for it; I now flatter myself that it is arrived, and in that confidence, venture to call your attention to my case. It is of some importance to you to know, if one, who formerly had your confidence to a great degree, actually betrayed and deserted you, and was guilty of the frauds, peculation, and treachery, with which he has been charged; or if artful, and designing men, inimical to him, have taken the advantage of his weakness, or imprudence, to charge him, with those enormous crimes, to excite a general clamour against him, and from his silence, to infer, in the strongest manner, his guilt. Though I may solicit your examination of the subject at this time, under very great disadvantages, yet I am by no means thereby deterred, from doing it. As yet you have heard but one side of the question, and that at a time when your situation made you justly apprehensive, and jealous of danger from every quarter, and rendered you, as it were, feelingly alive in every pore. At present when we are happily freed from the alarms, and dangers of war, you will not refuse to hear the other part, and thereby become capable of judging on the whole with certainty, and with justice, to the accuser, as well as to the accused, which is all I ask, or wish for. Unwilling to take up more of your time, than what is absolutely necessary, I shall not, in this address, recapitulate the many surmises, and insinuations thrown out by my enemies in the course of their persecuting of me, but confine myself to their direct charges, all of which, are comprehended under two heads: First, That I was guilty of fraud, and peculation, in the management of the public monies committed to my care; and Secondly, That after my return to France, in 1781, I wrote those letters, which were intercepted, and published in New-York, from interested motives, and with a base and treacherous design to injure my country, having previously engaged myself, in the interest of her enemies. If on an impartial examination of facts, you shall judge me guilty of these crimes, nothing that has hitherto been said, or done against me, will be deemed unjust, or too severe; but if, on the other hand, you shall, from the most unquestionable facts and circumstances, find those charges to be false and groundless, whatever weakness or imprudence you may find me justly chargeable with, you will, at least, acquit me of anything criminal, and pronounce me to be, a man more sinned against than sinning. My conduct in the early part of the late contest, and until my leaving America in April, 1776, to go for France in the character of commercial and political agent, and commissioner for the United States, is too well known, to require my referring to any part of it. The charges against me, originate, after that period; previous to it, I had no charge of public monies.

I arrived in France in June, 1776, and acted as sole commercial and political agent, for the United States until the month of December following, when I received a commission from Congress, appointing Doctor Franklin, Mr. Lee, and myself, their joint commissioners plenipotentiary. And I continued to act in this last character, until the first of April, 1778, when in obedience to the orders of Congress, I left Paris on my return to America, and from that period to the present hour, have not been entrusted with the monies of the public, or with any public employ. It therefore follows, that if frauds, peculation, and embezzlement, where practised and committed by me, they must have been, in and during that period, that is between April, 1776, and April 1778;-and that I must have committed them, in my transactions at Paris, where I constantly resided. The time and place being ascertained, the justice or injustice of this charge, will at once be seen, by an examination of my receipts, and disbursements of public monies. On the 4th of March, 1778, I received a positive order from Congress, to return immediately to America, to acquaint them with the state of their affairs in Europe; in the resolution of Congress transmitted, and in the letter accompanying of it, this appeared to be the only motive, and object of my recall.

Though the treaties with France, had been concluded and signed on the 6th of February preceding, yet they had still been kept secret, and, by agreement with the Court of France, were not to be made public in Europe, until intelligence should be received of their being arrived, and published in America; but several circumstances concurred at that time, to induce the Court of France to change their having entered into treaties of commerce and alliance with the United States, and to dispatch with all possible secrecy and expedition, the fleet then at Toulon to America, under the command of the Count d’Estaing; and the Count de Vergennes and Doctor Franklin, joined in advising me, to keep my recall, and my intention to return, secret, until the fleet should sail, in which it was proposed that I should embark.

At this time, most of the contracts for stores, arms, cloathing, &c. and for ships to transport them to America, were compleated; the execution of those contracts had been principally under my direction, but though monies had been advanced on all of them, the accounts of the contractors, had not been brought in for settlement, and it was impossible for me, (if I literally complied with the order of Congress, and with the urgent request of the French Minister, and of Dr. Franklin, to go out in the fleet;) to do any thing previously, towards the calling in and settling the public, or even my private accounts; any attempt that way, would have defeated the secrecy, and dispatch enjoined me. Though nothing appeared in the order of Congress, or in any of their letters, which intimated the least dissatisfaction with my conduct, or any suspicion of the faithful management, and application of the public monies, yet as I had, from the first, the misfortune, to have in Mr. Lee, one of my colleagues, a most jealous, and artful enemy, and sensible that many ill offices, had been done me in America, I was extremely desirous to put off my return, until all the transactions, in which I had had any concern, for the public, should be settled and closed: but finally, I submitted, to the advice on Count de Vergennes, and of Doctor Franklin, and contented myself, with taking from Mr. Grand, the Banker for Congress, an accompt of all the monies received, or paid out, on accompt of the United States, up to that time, this was all that was in my power to do; and as Mr. Grand, had mentioned in this accompt, the names of all the persons to whom he had paid the money, and as I carried out with me, the most honourable testimonials, from his most Christian Majesty, from his Minister, and from my colleague and intimate friend, Doctor Franklin, of my zeal and integrity in the service of my country, I had no reason to apprehend the being censured for not having settled, and brought out with me all the public accompts, and their vouchers, in detail; but on my arrival in Philadelphia, I soon found that my enemies, had been to a certain degree successful, in poisoning the minds of the public, by insinuating that I had become immensely rich, in their service, and consequently, that I must have been guilty of undue, and dishonest practices; and though I had been sent for, expressly to inform Congress, of the state of their affairs in Europe, and notwithstanding the honorable characters I had sustained, as their political and commercial Agent, and afterwards as one of their Commissioners Plenipotentiaries, I could not obtain an audience of that body, until after six weeks attendance and solicitation.

I then gave them, verbally, faithful detail of the state of their affairs n Europe, and laid before them Mr. Grand’s accompt, of the receipts and payments of monies, to the time of my leaving Paris; and requested, that if there had been any charge, or insinuation against me, for mismanagement or neglect, that I might be informed of it, and be permitted to be heard in my defence. I was not told of any; and though Congress appeared no ways dissatisfied with the account I then gave them of the state of their affairs in Europe, and of my own Conduct in their service; and though the settlement of the public, as well as my private accompts pressed me to return as early as possible to France, yet I could not obtain any resolution of Congress, either to approve, or disapprove, of any part of my conduct; and though I almost daily solicited for a second audience, I did not obtain one, until late in December following; I then gave them a written narrative of my transactions, from my leaving America, in their service, until my recall and return.

Congress then appeared disposed, to take the matter up, and to examine it, and to come to some determination on the subject; a committee was appointed to examine the state of their foreign affairs, and into the conduct of their commissioners and agents, and for greater dispatch, the committee were ordered to meet every evening, Saturday and Sunday evenings excepted; yet that committee never condescended, to admit me to an audience, or to ask me a single question on the subject of their enquiry; and though I had been sent for expressly to inform the Congress of the state of their affairs in Europe, yet their committee studiously evaded, the giving me an opportunity of laying before them, any information on the subject, or of explaining any part of my own conduct whilst in their service. During more than fourteen months attendance in Philadelphia, I obtained but two audiences from Congress, and none from their committee, whose proceedings and report (if indeed they made any) were kept secret from me. –In December, 1778, having waited five months in Philadelphia, almost daily soliciting Congress to examine my transactions whilst in their service, I found that a party, determined on my ruin, had sufficient interest to prevent all examination, and to bear me down, by the most mortifying delay, and neglect; I therefore resolved to lay my case before my countrymen, and fellow-citizens, but on my first address, Congress resolved to give me an audience, and afterwards appointed a committee, as I have before mentioned. –As I then flattered myself, that Congress had resolved to examine into the state of their foreign affairs, and of those transactions in which I had been a principal actor, and to come to some determination on the subject, I could not consider myself at liberty to proceed, in publishing the state of my case; in the mean time I was attacked, and abused, in the most base and outrageous manner, in the public papers. I made no reply to the many calumnies and falsehoods published by a noted scribbler, and by his associates and patrons, but earnestly requested of Congress, and their committee, to grant me a hearing, and to do me justice; but my solicitations were ineffectual; though from December 1778, to August 1779, I wrote more than thirty letters to Congress, humbly petitioning for a public examination, and trial, yet they never condescended to take the least notice, of my requests. In private conversation with the members, I was told, that the only difficulty lay in my accounts not being settled. To obviate this I returned to France, on assurances from Congress, that they had appointed, and empowered a gentleman in France, to audit and settle all their public accounts; but on my arrival to France, in July, 1780, and application to him, I found that his power was so limited, that he declined acting under it. I wrote immediately to Congress, soliciting for more ample powers to him, or to some other person, and set myself to put not only my accounts, but those of my colleagues, and of every one, with whom I had transacted any business on account of the public, in a state for being audited, and settled; and I passed more than twelve months at Paris, at a heavy expence, flattering myself, that as Congress had made no objection whatever, to any part of my conduct in their service, except my not having settled my accounts, and as my enemies, both in Congress and out of it, professed to believe that I was a defaulter, they would not, after the prodigious expence of time, and money, which I had been put to, delay the appointment of an auditor to examine my accounts, and to ascertain the only point in question with regard to me; but I heard nothing on the subject, until November, 1781, when I received a resolve of Congress, informing me, that by the appointment of a consul, provision was made for the settlement of my accounts; but in a few days after, I met with Mr. Barclay, the consul, who, to my extreme surprize, and disappointment, assured me, that he had no instructions on the subject; and a few days after this, I had the mortification of learning, tha my letters of May, and June preceding, had been intercepted, and published at New York, and that the most unfavourable construction had been put upon them, both in America and in France. This placed me in such a situation, as I believe, but few men have ever been so unfortunate as to experience. Proscribed in my own country and in France, and obnoxious to this government, I submitted to a tedious exile in Flanders, where I remained, until the treaty of peace was concluded; but, in the mean time, I transmitted my accounts to Congress, and solicited a settlement and the payment of the balance due to me: I also sent duplicates of them to Dr. Franklin. It is now more than eighteen months, since Congress have been in possession of my accounts; it is more than five years, since I had either the money, or any employment for the public, entrusted to my management.

Is it possible, that any fraud or embezzlement committed by me should remain undetected? Had I been guilty of any, would not my enemies, with all the particulars of my accounts in their power, have pointed them out and published them, instead of charging me generally with being a defaulter for unaccounted millions?

In March, 1778, Doctor Franklin assured Congress, that he had been an eye witness of my conduct in France, whilst his colleague, and that I had acted the part, of an able, active, and faithful minister, and to his knowledge had, in various ways, rendered great and important service to my country. In Dec. 1782, almost five years after, when, from our difference in political principles, he was no way prejudiced in my favour, and when, had I been guilty of fraud, or embezzlement, it was impossible but that it must have come to his knowledge, he certified, that he had never known, or suspected any cause to charge me with any want of probity, in any purchase, or bargain whatever, made by me, for the use or account of the United States. To charge me with being a defaulter, and with having defrauded my country of large sums of money, and at the same time to evade an examination and settlement of my accounts, by which only the justice or injustice of the charge could be ascertained, is a conduct which needs no comment, nor do I fear to rest my cause on it, and on the testimony, and certificate of Doctor Franklin; but clear and convincing as these proofs are of my innocence, I have a sufficiency of others, independent of the testimonies, or certificates of any man, or of the conduct of any set of men, whether friendly, or inimical to me.

In January, 1776, I contracted with the commercial committee of Congress to make a voyage to France, and to purchase for the public, goods the amount of forty thousand pounds sterling. They engaged to furnish me with that sum in cash or good bills, and to allow me a five per cent. commission on the purchase. At the same time, the secret committee appointed me the commercial and political agent for the United-States in Europe, and directed me to purchase for them one hundred pieces of brass cannon, and arms, and cloathing for twenty-five thousand men, and ammunition in proportion, and to procure ships, in Europe, to transport the whole to America; on these purchases, they also stipulated to give me five per cent. commission, and to make me a reasonable and adequate allowance for any political services I might render my country in France. When we reflect on the situation of our affairs at that period, it must be acknowledged that no man was ever charged with a more important commission, and when the circumstance of my being ignorant of the language, as well as of the manners and politics of the country, in which I was to execute it; without friend or patron to advise, to countenance, or to introduce me, and without that best of all patrons, and supporters, a fund adequate to the purpose; when these are taken into consideration, it must also be allowed, that no commission of this nature was ever attended with more difficulties, and embarrassments. I left Philadelphia in the month of March, 1776, in a brig bound to Bourdeau; and such was the situation of our affairs at that time, that she sailed with ballast only, on account of the want of any thing to make remittances with in a cargo. An accident at sea obliged her to return, and I reimbarked in a sloop bound to Bermuda. The funds put into my hands, to enable me to execute my commission, and to make the above-mentioned purchases, to the value of nearly 300,000£. sterling, amounted to little more, than three thousand, in bills of exchange, about one third of which were protested, and returned; and of near five thousand pounds afterwards remitted to me in bills, one small bill, of two hundred and thirty pounds only, was accepted, and paid; and from my leaving Philadelphia, in 1776, until my return in 1778, no remittances were made of any importance to enable me to execute this important commission, which I undertook to execute, more from a certainty, that foreign aid was become absolutely necessary, and that it must be obtained, or our country must soon be obliged to give over the contest, and to submit unconditionly to the British Parliament, than from any pecuniary or personal motives. On my arrival in France in June, 1776, I applied (agreeable to my instructions from the secret committee to the Minister, to obtain those supplies, on which the fate of the next year’s campaign, and the issue of the war depended, but received neither countenance, or encouragement from him, any farther than a general promise of personal protection, and that, provided my operations, in procuring the cannon, military stores, &c. from individuals, and shipping them to America, should be carried on with so much caution and secrecy, as to give no alarm to the British Ministers, the court of France would wink at the proceeding, but otherways they could not, as the treaties with Great-Britain, and the King’s ordinances, would not permit us to purchase and import military stores from France. My situation was extremely critical and arduous; I had in the first place to solicit a credit, from individuals, and to induce them to give it, I could not advance any part of the large capital wanted. I had not money even to defray the contingent expences, of the transportation of the stores, to the ports, at which they must be embarked, and I could give no other security for the articles wanted than my letter of instructions from the secret committee, authorising me make those purchases, and their general promise, in behalf of Congress, that the same should be paid for; but after I had obtained a credit, a still greater obstacle presented itself, for it was impossible to purchase a large train of artillery, and arms, cloathing, tents, and military stores for an army of twenty-five thousand men, and to transport the whole to the seaports, and embark them for America in such a secret, and private manner, as to elude the vigilence of the British Minister at the Court of Versailles, who, from my first arrival in Paris, could have been at no loss to conclude what the main object of my errand was.-In the month of July, I obtained a credit for the whole of the stores wanted, and for the charter of ships to transport them to America; and apprehensive that some part of them might be intercepted on their passage, I ventured to exceed the orders given me, and instead of one hundred, I purchased upwards of two hundred pieces of brass cannon, and mortars, and arms, cloathing, and stores, for thirty thousand men, though my instructions were but for twenty-five thousand.-Besides these purchases, for which I obtained a credit for twelve months, and a promise of a longer term on interest, I purchased other stores, such as powder, saltpeter, &c. to the amount of about fifteen thousand pounds, on three months credit: and relying on remittances, being on the way to me, I gave my notes, and bills for the money.- The cannon, arms, &c. were purchased in different parts of France, a great part of the cannon were to be transported upwards of two hundred miles, part of the way by land, to the sea ports; this could not be done secretly, and, he transportation of such a quantity of cannon and military stores, at a time when France was in profound peace, necessarily excited inquiries, and no one could remain at a loss, as to their destination;-the consequence was, that the British minister remonstrated, and orders were issued to suspend our operations; in a few days permission was privately obtained to proceed; fresh alarms were given, and repeated counter orders issued; whenever news unfavourable to us arrived from America, or the British Minister remonstrated in a high tone, all my operations were instantly suspended; a few anecdotes, and extracts of letters favourable to us, (whether authentic or not) with proper management, and a judicious application of douceurs, set the affair again in motion; and these permissions, and counter orders, succeeded each other every few weeks, and frequently oftener, until the stores were embarked; nor did the court quit this fluctuating mode of conduct, or give the least encouragement, of finally acting decisively in our favour, until the news of the surrender of General Burgoyne’s army, arrived in France;-in a word, our success or misfortunes, and the remonstrances of the British Minister, gave the tone, and stile of the French Ministers, from my arrival in France, to the receipt of the above-mentioned intelligence, and even until the signing of the treaties of the 6th of February, 1778.- It would require a volume, to give but a general history of these manœuvres, and of the embarrassments, and expences which attended them; unfortunately for me, as well for the creditor of those supplies, a great part of the expences were of such a nature, that no vouchers can ever be produced for them.-When it was known, that orders were going to be issued, to suspend the transportation, or the embarkation of the cannon and stores, or to forbid the ships loaded or loading with them, from failing, the doceurs given to delay such orders, or the execution of them, for a few days, or for a few hours only, as was sometimes the case;-the extra sums given to waggoners, to boatmen and others to exert themselves on such occasions, can never be supported by vouchers. What I have already said, is sufficient to give a general idea of my situation at that time, and of the obstacles and embarrassments which I had to encounter with;-and it is well known, that I so far surmounted them, as to have upwards of two hundred pieces of brass cannon and mortars, with thirty thousand fusils, with ammunition, cloathing and tents for an army of thirty thousand men at the ports, and ready to be embarked, and ships to receive them, in the month of November, within the short space of six months after my arrival in France.-It ought to be equally well known, that after the most positive orders were give by the Court, forbidding the embarkation of them, and the sailing of the ships, means were devised, and practised, so far to elude them, that two ships, the Amphitrite and Mercure, with near one hundred of the cannon, twenty thousand fusils, and other stores, under pretence of sailing for St. Domingo, were got to sea, and fortunately arrived at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire, in April, 1777; and that when General Burgoyne capitulated at Saratoga, his army was surrounded by men armed with those fusils, and supported by that train of artillery, purchased and sent out, as I have already mentioned; and as that event alone, brought France to conclude a treaty with us, and enter into a war with England, the purchase, and sending out those cannon, arms, and stores, in a great degree decided the fate, or the independence of the United States.-To shew that I do no over-rate the importance of these supplies, or my service in procuring of them, I must refer to Mons. Beaumarchais’ letter of 23d of March, 1778, to Congress, and to the letter from the President of Congress to him, of the 15th of January, 1779, Mons. Beaumarchais says, “I assure you, that if my zeal, my advances of money, my cargoes of stores and merchandise have been of service to the Honorable Congress, their gratitude on this occasion, is due to the indefatigable pains which Mr. Deane has taken through the whole of this transaction.”

Congress, on the 15th of January, 1779, say, “The Congress of the United States of America, sensible of your exertion in their favour, present you with their thanks, and assure you of their regard;-they lament the inconveniences you have suffered, by the great advances made in support of these States; circumstances have prevented a compliance with their wishes, but they will take the most effectual measures, in their power to discharge the debt due to you;-the liberal sentiments, and extensive views which alone could dictate a conduct like yours, are conspicuous in your actions, and adorn your character; while with great talents you served your Prince, you have gained the esteem of this infant republic, and will receive the merited applause of a new world.” I need not remind you of the treatment, which I met with, and that Congress, whilst they voted the thanks of the United States to Mons. Beaumarchais, and declared that his services, merited the applause of a new world, refused me an audience, or to take any notice of my petitions to them, for an examination of my conduct, whilst in the service of my country; although they at the same time knew, that but for me, the meritorious services, of that gentleman, would never have been performed.-Dr. Franklin arrived at Paris in December, 1776, but he brought no funds of any importance with him, from the Congress, and I found by his account of the state of affairs in America, that I could not depend on any remittances from thence. My situation was extremely distressing, the small sum which I brought out with me was expended, and my notes and bills above-mentioned were within a few weeks of becoming due; in this crisis the Court of France secretly interposed, and ordered Mr. Grand to pay us 500,000 livres quarterly, during the year ensuing; and the Farmers General advanced one million of livres on a contract for tobacco. (The two millions from the Court was then said to be a free gift, and I know not, but have heard, that it has lately been charged in the accompt of France, against the United States). By these sums I was enabled, to make good my personal engagements, and the commissioners put in a state to make further purchases of stores for our army, by advancing part of the purchase money. In the mean time, Congress, instead of making remittances, began to draw on their Commissioners for large sums, and in October, we found our funds so far exhausted, that our engagements exceeded what we could command, or depend on, by near two millions of livres. The Court was then at Fountainbleau, and, from the unfavorable accounts from America, appeared less disposed to assist us, than at any preceding period; but on my going to Fountainbleau, and informing the Minister of our situation, and that without an immediate advance of money, we could not execute the contracts we had entered into, for cloathing, &c., and must give over any further attempts to furnish our countrymen, with stores for prosecuting the war, I obtained a promise from him, that Mr. Grand should pay us, three million of livres in the course of the year then ensuing, in quarterly payments; this enabled us to make good our engagements. At the time of my leaving France to return to America, the first quarter, or 750,000 livres had become due, and Mr. Grand had given the United States credit for that sum, which with the sums before-mentioned, amounted to 3,750,000 livres, which was the total of the monies received by Mr. Grand on our account to that time, and his accounts which I gave to Congress in August, 1778, shew to whom, and on what account he paid it out; and that he paid me 69,225 livres 7s. 6d. for my private expences; I have charged Congress with the sum of 100,947 livres 1/4 for the whole amount of them, from my engaging in the public service in January, 1776, to my return to France, in July, 1780, to settle the public accounts.-Mr. Arthur Lee, in his letter to Congress, dated June 1, 1778, says, “I find that the expence of living in character, cannot be less than three thousand pounds sterling per annum, and adds, if left to themselves, I conceive that most persons will exceed that sum;” that is 68571 livres. I was (as Mr. Lee expresses it) left to myself, but I did not exceed that sum. From June, 1776, to April, 1778, almost two years, I advanced nearly the whole of the monies paid out for the relief of prisoners; the sum of 6406 livres 5s. 6d. only was paid by the banker; my charges for this department amount to 19,225 livres 7s. 10d. but in eleven months from my recall, Congress are charged by the Commissioners, with the sum of 33,782 livres 19s. advanced to prisoners; from such facts, a judgment may be formed of my œconomy, or dissipation whilst in the service of my country. The amount of my charges to Congress, exclusive of my commission account, is 258,194 livres 9s. 2d. of which my expences already mentioned, amount to 100,947 livres 1/4, the remainder was for my time, and disbursements of various kinds, specified in my account, long since before Congress, on this account the balance is 175,107 livres 1/2 in my favour.-Mr. William Lee made one journey to Vienna, on account of the public, and Mr. Izard who was at Paris for the education of his children, received whilst there a commission from Congress to the Court of Tuscany, but never went out of Paris or quitted his family on the business of the public; the former of these gentlemen received 72,000 livres, and the latter 60,000 for their private expences; yet these men are among the loudest against me for an extravagant waste public money.-And permit me here, my countrymen and fellow-citizens, to request, that you will examine for yourselves, or that if your distance from Congress, will not permit you to do it, that you will demand of your delegate an account of all the monies ever remitted to me by Congress, or that I ever received on their ac-accompt; by this you will be able to form a judgement, with, sufficient precision, if I am a defaulter for millions, as has been asserted by my enemies, or one of the public creditors.

But exclusive of the above balance due to me, after accounting for all the monies, received by me, I am entitled to a commission of five per cent. on goods and military stores purchased by me, to the amount of 4,756,393 livres, 17 sols, which makes the sum of 238,445 livres, expences of postage, &c., included. These goods and military stores I purchased, previous to the arrival of my colleagues, in consequence of the order given me by the secret committee of Congress, and on which I was promised the same commission, as was then given to other agents and purchasers, which was uniformly five per cent.-For the purchases made jointly with my colleagues, I have not charged any thing, being then in a different capacity, as joint commissioner plenipotentiary, with them. Thus it appears, that instead of being a defaulter, I am one of the public creditors, and to a large amount; and of all the public creditors, perhaps no one has suffered so much in point of interest, certainly no one so much in point of character; but of this I may take notice, on some future occasion. I need not take up any more of your time at present on the subject of my accounts, they have long since been before Congress, and to them I appeal, to justify the general state, which I have given of my money transactions for the public. I have shewn, and it will appear from them, that from my arrival in France in June, 1776, to the December following, when joined by Doctor Franklin and Mr. Lee, I had had no money; or next to none of the public’s, at any time in my hands; but on the contrary, was at that time, in advance for my employers; and that afterwards, until my return to America, I did not receive a sum, any way equal to my expences and disbursements; and from that period to the present, I have not had any public employment. The second charge against me is, on account of my having in May and June, 1781, wrote my opinion of our public affairs to my friends in America, and advised peace, and an accommodation with Great-Britain.

I confess that the letters published by Rivington in New-York, as mine, do not materially differ from those which I actually wrote at that time, and which, unfortunately for me, were intercepted; and that they contain the undisguised sentiments of my heart, on the then apparent situation of our affairs; but I never yet heard of its being, a crime in any free state, for the citizens of it to give their opinion, and advice on public affairs, and measures. To suppose me to have been in the interest of the ministers of this country, and to have wrote those letters to promote their views, is as absurd as to suppose, that I amassed an immense fortune in the service of my country; yet, although my well known circumstances, and connections, at that period, and previous to it, as well as since, demonstrate the absurdity, and falsehood of such suppositions, yet both the one, and the other have been not only suggested, but positively asserted, by certain writers in America, who stick at nothing, however extravagant.

I can hardly imagine, notwithstanding the late, and present prosperous state of our affairs, that any one can have forgot the situation, in which they were in 1781, when I wrote those letters, and previous to the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, and of his army at York. In May, and in June, 1781, the British forces were in possession, of the whole of our sea coast, from the Chesapeak southward; and whilst they ravaged, and distressed the interior country, their ships of war and cruizers intercepted almost the whole of our trade, and of our supplies. We had no naval force, to oppose to theirs, nor any probability at that time, that our ally would send to our assistance, a naval force superior to that of the enemy. The army under General Washington, was too weak of itself, for any offensive operations; and Congress had neither money or credit, to put it on a more respectable footing. General Washington did not scruple at that period to declare, “that without a decidedly superior fleet to that of Great-Britain in America, all opposition to the British forces in America, would soon be at an end.” All the letters from America were in the same stile; many circumstances at that time, my own observations, and the information I was then in the way of, led me to conclude, that there was not the least probability, of there being a French fleet on our coast that campaign, superior to the British. Accidents, and circumstances, unforeseen at that time, and those extremely improbable ones, gave the French fleet that superiority, which alone decided the fate of Lord Cornwallis, and of his army at York. Had not this event happened, of which, when I wrote, there was not the most distant probability, the war must have terminated against us in that campaign;-In this I was supported by the unanimous opinion of the best judges on the subject, then in America: was it a crime in me, to write to America in the same stile, in which our Generals, and leading men, wrote to their friends in Europe? My letters have been published theirs have not; this is the sole difference, except the cruel circumstance of mine, having been published by the enemy, at a time when our danger was over, and when the publication could serve no other purpose, but to ruin me in the opinion of my countrymen.

At the time of my writing, every thing conspired to convince me, that France had only her own interest, and that of Spain in view, in the war; and that however it might terminate, she would be very far from consulting our interest in the peace; persuaded of this, I wrote it to be my opinion, and for this I have been deemed an enemy and traitor to France, as well as to the United Sates.

But have not events, in part already justified this opinion of mine? You best know by what intrigues the French Court prevailed with Congress, to order our commissioners, not to sign any treaty with Great-Britain, without the knowledge and consent of the Court of Versailles; and thus to put our future peace, liberty and safety, absolutely into their power: nor can you, I presume, be ignorant, that the Court of France, having thus bound us, began to take off the mask, and to take measures with, and to propose terms to, the other powers for excluding us from the fisheries, and for supporting the extravagant claims of Spain to East Louisiana; and that our commissioners alarmed at this, wisely ventured to sign the preliminary articles, without either the knowledge or consent of the Ministers at Versailles. Are not these well known facts abundantly sufficient to justify me for having in 1781, entertained suspicions of France, in her professions of disinterested friendship to the United States? By our treaty with Great-Britain, we are entitled to a right in her share of the Newfoundland and Nova-Scotia fisheries; but has not France wholly excluded us from any in hers? Does not France at this time encourage and support Spain, in her claims to the richest and most extensive part of the territory allowed by Great-Britain, in the late treaty, to belong to us? These attempts are not marks of friendship, but are the most unequivocal characteristics of that insidious, interested policy, which I pointed out in my letters, and warned my friends to be on their guard against.

In my letter to Mr. Morris, I gave him my opinion, with respect to the future state of our commerce, under independent sovereignty, and the grounds on which I was led to form it; and I shall be happy, if experience, (which alone can decide in such cases) proves that my opinion and reasoning on that subject, were erroneous and ill-founded. Apprehensive at the time, and distressed by the thought, that we must either fail in the contest, and in such case submit to the laws of our conquerors, rendered imperious and severe from their success; or, that if successful ourselves, that in the situation in which our country must be on the peace, burthened with heavy taxes on account of the public debts contracted by the war, and still heavier for the future support of independent sovereignty, and at the same time exposed to the evils arising from internal factions and divisions, and from our jarring and incompatible interests; that our democratic governments, which we had established in Congress, and in our several States, would not be found to have sufficient energy and coercion to establish and maintain such a degree of order, and of due subordination, as must ever be indispensibly necessary in all governments, to prevent anarchy and confusion; And that in such a situation, independent sovereignty, instead of proving a blessing, must become the heaviest misfortune, which could befall us;-Strongly impressed by this opinion, I judged it to be my duty, to urge and press my countrymen, by every argument in my power, to improve that important crisis, and by an accommodation, and re-union with Great-Britain, on equal, safe, and honourable terms, to secure our future peace, safety and liberty, both internal and external.

I then thought that a re-union, not simply on the condition of being replace in the State, in which we were, previous to 1763; (for which alone, Congress in 1774, and afterwards in 1775, petitioned,) but on conditions and terms, every way preferable; viz: Those of being governed, solely by laws of our own enacting, and of being taxed only by our assemblies, and of enjoying the same commercial privileges, and protections, as other subjects of the British Empire were, or might be entitled to; I say that it was then my opinion, that an accommodation and re-union on those terms, was to be preferred to a continuation of the war, to running the risque of its uncertain issue, and to hazarding the dangerous experiment of Independent Sovereignty.-This opinion of mine, has been deemed a crime little short of that of high treason.-But it ought to be remembered, that this was simply my opinion, and that I communicated it to my friends, at a time, when our prospects were gloomy and discouraging.

It is proper here, to review the sentiments of the first, and of the second Congress of this subject; the first in their resolutions, and in their petition to the King, complain of no grievances anterior to 1763; their words are: “We present this petition, only to obtain redress of grievances, and relief from fears, and jealousies, occasioned by the system of statutes, and regulations adopted since the close of the late war, for raising a revenue in America;-extending the powers of the Courts of Admiralty, and Vice Admiralty;-trying persons in Great-Britain, for offences alleged to be committed in America;-affecting the Province of the Massachusett’s-Bay; and altering the government, and extending the limits of Quebec.” This is the list of grievances, then enumerated, and they add, “ By the abolition of which system, the harmony between Great-Britain, and these Colonies, so necessary to the happiness of both, and so ardently desired by the latter, and the usual intercourses will be immediately restore;-for, appealing to that Being who searches thoroughly the hearts of his creatures; we solemnly profess, that our councils have been influenced by no other motive, than a dread of impending destruction.” (That is from the above system). “Permit us then, most gracious Sovereign, in the name of all your faithful people in America, with the utmost humility to implore you, for the honor of Almighty God, whose pure religion our enemies are undermining, for your glory, which can be advanced only by rendering your subjects happy, for he interest of your family; depending on an adherence to the principles that enthroned it; for the safety and welfare of your kingdoms, and dominions, threatened with almost unavoidable dangers, and distresses, that your Majesty, as the loving father of your whole people, connected by the same bonds, of law, loyalty, faith and blood, though dwelling in different countries, will not suffer the transcendant relation formed by these ties to be farther violated, in uncertain expectation of effects that, if attained, never can compensate for the calamities through which they must be gained, we therefore, &c.”-These were the sentiments of the first Congress;-the second, though convened after hostilities had been commenced, and although their petition was agreed to, after they had made an arrangementf o the army, had commissioned the generals, had issued money and become to all intents, de facto, Independent; yet they still persevered in the same sentiments, as to their grievances, and the terms on which a reconciliation was desired; they refer to the petition of the first Congress, and solemnly “declare, before God and the world, that they had not raised armies with the ambitious designs, of separating from Great-Britain, and establishing Independent States, and that they fought, not for glory or conquest;” and add, “attached to your majesty’s Person, Family, and Government, with all that devotion which principle, or affection can inspire, connected with Great-Britain, by the strongest ties which can unite societies, our breasts retain too tender a regard for the kingdom from which we derive our origin, to request such a reconciliation as might in any manner be inconsistent, with her dignity and welfare; these related as we are to her, honor and duty, as well as inclination, induce us to support and advance.” Within a few days after signing this petition, Doctor Franklin drew up several resolutions in form of proposals, to be made by Congress for a reconciliation, which he introduced in the following words; “Forasmuch as the enemies of America, in the Parliament of Great-Britain, to render us odious to the nation, and give an ill impression of us in the minds of others European Powers, have represented us unjust and ungrateful in the highest degree; asserting on every occasion, that the Colonies were settled at the expence of Britain, &c. That they aim at independency, that they intend an abolition of the Navigation Acts, &c. and as by frequent repetition of these groundless assertions, and malicious calumnies, may, if not contradicted and refuted, obtain farther credit, and be injurious throughout Europe to the reputation, and interest of the confederated Colonies, it seems proper, and necessary to examine them in our own just vindication.” He then proceeds to shew, that these charges were groundless, and then to make the following proposals: “That on a Reconciliation with Britain, we shall not only continue to grant aid in time of war, but whenever she shall think fit to abolish her monopoly, and give us the same privileges in trade, as Scotland received at the Union, and allow us a free commerce with all the rest of the world, we shall willingly agree to give and pay into the sinking fund, 100,000 L. sterling annually, for the space of one hundred years to come, which duty, faithfully and inviolably applied, to that purpose, is demonstrably more than sufficient to extinguish all her present national debt, &c. But if Britain does not think fit to accept this proposition, we, in order to remove her groundless jealousies, that we aim at independence, and an abolition of the Navigation Act, which, in truth, has never been our intention, and to avoid all future disputes about the right of making that, and other acts, for the regulating our commerce, do hereby declare ourselves ready, and willing to enter into a covenant with Great-Britain, that she shall fully possess, enjoy, and exercise that right for one hundred years to come.” (See the Doctor’s political, miscellaneous and philosophical pieces, fol. 357). His editor says, “This paper was drawn up in a committee of Congress, June 25, 1775, but does not appear on their minutes; a severe act of parliament which arrived about the same time, having determined them not to give the sum proposed in it”. But the editor was misinformed; the paper here referred to, was not drawn up in a committee, nor by the direction of Congress, or by the advice of a committee.-Doctor Franklin first committed his thoughts, on the terms for a reconciliation, to writing, and afterwards, in a committee, which was appointed for a very different purpose, whilst their report was transcribing, he read the draught abovementioned: Col. R. H. Lee, who was one of the committee, approved of it, and requested the Doctor to lay it before Congress, or to permit him to do it, not as a report, for no committee had been appointed on the subject, but in the usual way of motion, by an individual member; Doctor Franklin declined the taking of this, on himself, and gave the paper to Col. Lee, who the next day introduced, and read it in Congress, and moved that the two proposals contained in it, should pass into resolutions of the house; the motion was seconded, and supported by a delegate from one of the New-England states, since unjustly charged, with having aimed at independence from the first of the dispute: the proposals appeared no way disagreeable to the house, but it was observed, that having but a few days before, in a petition to his Majesty, requested him to direct the mode and forms “for a happy, and permanent reconciliation,” it was proper to wait the effects of that petition, and that, in the mean time, to make any specific proposals, would be premature, and to a certain degree inconsistent with our own requests; besides this objection, a great part of the members, especially of those from the Southern states, were still confident that the prayer of our petition would be granted, and a reconciliation take place on the terms, of our being restored to the state in which we were, at and previous to 1763. On these considerations the motion was withdrawn; and the reason why no entry was made of it, in the minutes or journals of Congress, was, least after being restored unconditionally to the state in which we were in 1763, future advantage might be taken of these offers. As I was one of the committee, to whom the contents of this paper was first communicated, and in Congress during the transaction, I cannot in justice to the wishes, and disposition of Congress, at that time for a reconciliation, omit giving this brief history of those proposals; and in justice to myself, I must observe, that the terms proposed by me in my letters, are infinitely preferable, to those offered, and prayed for by the first, and second Congress, as well as to those contained in this paper drawn up by Doctor Franklin. After the declaration of independence, Doctor Franklin, with the knowledge and approbation of Congress, corresponded with Lord Howe; in his letter of the 30th of July, 1776. to his Lordship, he says, “Long did I endeavour with unfeigned and unwearied zeal, to preserve from breaking that fine, and noble china vase, the British empire; for I knew, that being once broken, the separate parts could not retain, even their share of the strength, and value, which existed in the whole, and that a perfect re-union, of those parts could scarce ever be hoped for.” Was it a crime in me, in 1781, to wish for a perfect re-union, and in private letters, to urge my friends to do all in their power to promote, and bring about an event (which by the Doctor’s letter, appears to have been, even in 1776) most devoutly to be wished for?

But we now enjoy independent sovereignty and peace, on the most favourable and honourable terms, and have obtained every thing which we either hoped for, or demanded; and happy, indeed, should I be, were I certain, that none of the evils, which I apprehended in 1781, were either felt, or feared by my countrymen at this time; in such case I should be contented to be ridiculed, or even pitied for my weak, and gloomy forebodings. But General Washington, in his circular letter, says, “That it is a question, yet to be decided, whether the revolution must ultimately be considered as blessing or a curse. A blessing or a curse, not to the present age alone, for with our fate will the destiny of unborn millions be involved.” I ask, that these expressions of the General, after the great object of our independent sovereignty, has been obtained, and ratified by treaties, may be compared with the expressions in my letters of 1781, on the same subject, and that my countrymen will then say, if it was a criminal desertion of the cause, of my country, or if it was an unpardonable weakness, and despondency of mind in me at that time, to make a question of that, which now, when success and peace, have secured our independent sovereignty, is by General Washington declared to be still a question undecided and doubtful, and that not only so as to the present day, but to future ages. If, indeed, the small degree of order, of restraint, and of subordination, which has for the last seven years prevailed in our country, be now thrown off, and the legislative and executive powers once more return, in effect, into the hands of committees, and conventions; if in place of that subordination to law and government, of those decent, frugal, and virtuous manners, and habits; of that ease and even affluence, in which our fellow-citizens formerly lived in peace and safety; in a word, if instead of those manners, principles, and circumstances, which once marked our character, the reverse should in future take place, and prevail, under a government too weak, to prevent or remedy the evils, there cannot then remain a question on the subject, but such anarchy and confussion must ensue, as to render our independence a curse, and the present and future age in America, as unhappy as any ages to be met with, in the history of civilized nations have ever been.

The great end of civil society is, to secure to men united in it, the great blessings of peace, of liberty and safety, both in their persons and in their property, and in deciding what form of government most effectually answers this great and beneficent purpose, experience, not theory, must direct us.

This is not a subject for recluse philosophers, or subtle metaphysicians, to decide on in their closets;-and whenever they have been referred to, they have given the preference to Utopian, or ideal and imaginary systems of their own, before those plain and simple ones, which experience has shewn to be practicable and safe.-But without looking abroad, to profit the experience of other nations, our own must now, with the utmost precision, and certainty, determine this great question, as yet undecided, and bring conviction, home to every one; either that our present system of government is preferable, to that under which we and our ancestors, for more than one century and a half, were free, safe, and happy, or that it is not. Our situation previous to the late revolution, must be still fresh in our memories, and our present, cannot long be disguised or misunderstood by us, from our senses; from what we see and feel, we must judge with certainty for it; and by comparing the present with the past, this important question must ultimately be decided.

If happily for us, it be in favour of the present, no man will more sincerely rejoice than what I shall on the occasion; but if on a comparison of our present with our past situation, the revolution should, which General Washington, seems to apprehend, be found a curse, instead of a blessing then indeed, I shall be one of the most unhappy of men, and the sole consolation which will be left me, will be (the almost only one which I now enjoy) a consciousness of my integrity in the service of my country, and of the purity and rectitude of my intentions, in the opinion and advice, which, in 1781, I gave in my letters to my friends in America.-Having shewn, that instead of being a defaulter, I am a crediter of the public’s to a considerable amount, and impartially stated the contents, and objects of my letters of 1781, I shall take my leave for the present, and submit the whole, to your candid consideration, and whatever my fate may be, if to be restored to your good opinion and confidence, and to the bosom of my friends, and country, or to remain far exiled from them, the first and most ardent wish of my soul, will ever be, that my country’s happiness will be perpetual, in the full enjoyment of peace, liberty and safety.

I am with great sincerity and respect, your friend and fellow citizen.
London, August, 10, 1783.
S. Deane.

P.S. I have avoided entering on the subject of the numerous calumnies, which have been propagated against me, by anonymous writers, it would have been endless, and quite unnecessary, since every thing which has either been said or suggested against me, may be reduced to two questions only. First, if I acted faithfully, and was an honest steward of the public money, whilst in the service of my country; and secondly, if the contents of my letters of May, and June, 1781, were of such a nature as to merit the harsh censures, passed on me in America on their account; In France, I can expect no other, than to be condemned, it is what every one must expect, who calls in question, the disinterestedness of the motives of France in the late war, or who attempts to prevent our country, from becoming virtually dependent on that power. As to the reports circulated here, and which may probably reach America, of my being at the levees of the Ministers, and in frequent conference with them, and that I have acted an unfriendly part respecting our commerce, and the like, I can with the greatest truth and sincerity declare, that there is not the least foundation for them, I have not so much as seen any of the Ministers, since my arrival in this country. -And as to our commerce, I gave my opinion in 1781, in my letter to Mr. Morris, as to the restrictions, which I thought it would fall under on a peace; if any part of what I then apprehended has been realized, I am not to blame; I most heartily wish that no part of it may ever be so, but that experience may shew me, to have been in an error in what I wrote on that subject.

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APPENDIX.

No. 1.
Copy of a letter from the Count de Vergennes to the President of the Congress,
March 25th, 1778.

Sir, -Mr. Deane being about to return to America, I embrace the occasion with pleasure, to give my testimony to the zeal, activity, and intelligence with which he has conducted the interests of the United States, by which he has merited the esteem of the King, my Master, and for which his Majesty has been pleased to give him marks of his satisfaction.

Mr. Deane will be able to inform Congress of the disposition of the King toward the United States; the engagements formed with his majesty will doubtless satisfy their wishes. The King, on his part, is not only convinced that they are founded on principles unalterable, but also that they will contribute to the happiness of both nations.

I have the honor to be with the most sincere attachment,
Your most humble and obedient servant,
De Vergennes.

No. 2.
Letter from his Excellency the Count de Vergennes, Minister and Secretary of State,
March 26th, 1778.
[see document 36 of Silas Deane Online]

No. 3.
Benjamin Franklin to the President of Congress,
March 31st, 1778.
[see document 36 of Silas Deane Online]

No. 4.
Certificate of Benjamin Franklin,
December 18th, 1782.

Certain paragraphs having lately appeared in the English newspapers, imputing that Silas Deane, Esq., formerly Agent and Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, has, some time after his first “arrival in France, purchased in that kingdom, for the use of his countrymen, 30,000 muskets, &c.; that he gave three livres for each of them, being old condemned arms; that he had them cleaned and vamped up, which cost near three livres more; and that for each of these he charged and received a louis d’or;” and that he also committed similar frauds in the purchase of other articles for the use of his country; and Mr. Deane having represented that the said paragraphs are likely to injure him in the opinions of many persons unacquainted with his conduct whilst in the public service, I think it my duty, in compliance with his request, to certify and declare that the paragraphs in question, according to my best knowledge and belief, are entirely false, and that I have never known or suspected any cause to charge the saidSilas Deane with any want of probity, in any purchase, or bargain, whatever, made by him for the use or account of the United States.

Given at Passay, the 18th, of December, 1782.

B. Franklin.

Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, at the Court of France.

No.5.
Instructions of Secret Committee of Congress to Silas Deane.
March 2nd, 1776.
[see document 17 of Silas Deane Online]

The following letter contains the substance of what in 1781, I wrote to my friends and correspondents in America, in those letters which were intercepted and published in New York. Where the publication by Rivington differs from the original, I have noted and corrected it in this, and therefore the present may be relied on to be authentic. The variations in this, or in any of those letters as published, from the originals, are not so material as to acquit me of the censures already passed on me by my countrymen on account of their contents. If, on an impartial examination of the sentiments expressed in them, and on a review of the state of public affairs at the time when I wrote, it shall be judged that I merited those censures, I have selected this letter because that it contains, more fully than any one of the others, my sentiments, at the time, of the past and the then probable future situation of the commerce of the United States under independent sovereignty. The very unfavourable appearance of the war on the part of my country at the time when I wrote, added to the treatment which I had met with by the prevalence of a faction in America, and to a series of private misfortunes, may be supposed to have cast a gloom over a mind by nature and habit not either volatile or sanguine, and to have turned my view to the unfavourable side of the objects before me. With the candid and generous these circumstances will apologize for me, if indeed any apology can be tho’t necessary for a free citizen’s having communicated his sentiments on subjects of infinite importance to his country, in confidential letters to his fellow-citizens and intimate friends. If this be a crime, if by this I have merited the obloquy and censure with which I have been loaded in America, I can only say that it is a newly discovered crime and that a correspondence similar to that of mine was never before deemed criminal or reprehensible in any free state, from the earliest ages of the world to the present.

From various circumstances and accidents, unforeseen and improbably at the time, the issue of the war, with some other less important events, have been very different from what I feared, and thought to be inevitable when I wrote. This has afforded a subject for triumph over me to those who judge of men and of measures only by events. I do not repine at their triumph; on the contrary, I most ardently pray that it may be compleat, and that not one of the evils which my gloomy imagination foreboded in 1781, may ever be realized. The substances of all my letters which were intercepted and published, tended, in the first place, to shew the extreme improbability of the final establishment of the independent sovereignty of the United States; and, secondly, that if established, it would prove rather a curse than a blessing to us. The first point is already determined, and, contrary to the appearance of the war in 1781, our independence and sovereignty are acknowledged and confirmed to us by the treaty of peace; but the second, and infinitely the most important, is a question which General Washington, in his circular letter, says, it is still to be decided. At the date of my letters in May, and June, 1781, the issue of the war was at best doubtful; but he wrote after the war had been concluded, and the independent sovereignty of the United States was confirmed in the most explicit and favourable terms, yet he says: “It is a question which remains still to be decided, whether the revolution must ultimately be considered as a blessing or a curse –a blessing or a curse, not to the present age alone, for with our fate the destiny of unborn millions be involved.” In my letter of the 20th of May, 1781, to Mr. Root, after a brief review of the progress of the war, and of the state of our affairs at that time, I said: “From these reflections, combined with all the facts and informations that I have been able to obtain, I have deuced two propositions, of the truth of which I am fully convinced, however extraordinary they may appear in America. The first of these is, that there is no probability of our being able finally to establish our independency; and the second, that if it were established it would prove rather a curse than a blessing to us.” My views in publishing this letter, with a few observations on it, are, in the first place, to obtain a calm and impartial rehearing, in which I flatter myself that I shall not be condemned for having, in 1781, given it as my opinion that independence, if obtained, would “prove rather a curse, than a blessing to us,” since, after its being established, General Washington, in his letter referred to above, declares it to be a question still undecided; Secondly, to shew my countrymen (who have been told that I am inimical to their commercial interests) what my sentiments were, in 1781, as to the embarrassments and restrictions which our commerce must necessarily meet with under independent sovereignty, and that if events have hitherto tended to justify those sentiments, I cannot thence be culpable for having foreseen what from the first to the present moment I have done everything in my power to prevent. And in the last place, by again laying before my countrymen, or reminding them of the principles and grounds on which I formed my opinion, that our political and commercial situation would be every way less favourable under independency than what it had been previous to our separation from Great-Britain, or that independency would prove rather a curse than a blessing, I may excite them to take proper and reasonable measures to avoid those evils which I apprehended when I wrote those letters. If I succeed in these points, I shall be perfectly satisfied; and if in the last only, by much the most important object, in my view, will be obtained…

*[As of June 10th, 1781,] the British forces were in possession of New-York, of Long-Island, and Staten-Island; of all the sea coast from the Capes of Virginia southward; they had penetrated far into the country without meeting any material resistance, and had such a decided superiority in the American seas that full three-fourths of all the vessels that put to sea from the United States were captured; the paper of Congress could not be passed at any rate, and General Washington, with other general officers, in their letters to their friends in Europe did not scruple to say that, without aid from France, in money to pay the troops, and a fleet decidedly superior to the British, all opposition would end with that campaign. The whole of the naval force ordered by France to America that season (that is, to the Continent and to the West-Indies) was not equal to that of the British then on those seas. The Count de Grasse, who commanded, was ordered first to the West-Indies, and thence to the Continent; but as upwards of four hundred sail of French merchant ships would in the course of that summer be in want of a convoy from the West-Indies to Europe, it was given out and expected that the Count, previous to his sailing to the northward, would send off that rich fleet of merchantmen under a strong convoy, which would have rendered him unable to do more on the American coast than to give some temporary relief, and to act on the defensive. No one at the time could foresee or rationally presume, first, that the Count de Grasse would leave that immensely valuable fleet to remain in port for want of a convoy, and take every French ship of war in the West-Indies with him to the northward; or, secondly, that Lord Cornwallis, after having made himself master of all the sea coast, from the Capes of Virginia southward, would fix on one of the most unfavourable positions in all that country to encamp and fortify on; thirdly, Gen. Clinton would suffer Gen. Washington and Count Rochambeau, to march without opposition to Virginia; or, lastly, that when the Count de Grasse took his whole force to the northward, several British ships of the line would still remain in the West-Indies, and thereby give the French fleet a superiority to the British. As no one of these events could be rationally expected or hoped for at that time; and as without a concurrence of all of them, Lord Cornwallis’s army would not have been captured, and the campaign of 1781, must have terminated as much against the United States as by this singular concurrence of improbable events it ended in our favour; it may with great justice be said, that the affairs of the United States never were at any period in a more critical and dangerous situation; and every one who reads the whole of those letters, will see, that the mind of the writer was deeply impressed with a sense of the impending dangers, and anxiously solicitous, with his countrymen, to take such measures as appeared to him the best calculated to avoid them.

A great part of the observations, contained in the foregoing letter, on the situation, of the commerce of the United States, under independent sovereignty, have been, already verified by experience; and it is worthy of remark, that as the first uneasiness in America, with the Government of Great-Britain, arose on account of the restrictions, laid by Parliament on commerce; so almost the only obstacle, which at this day remains, to prevent a restoration of the most perfect friendship, between the subjects, of both countries, is their jealousy, or different views of this object.- Neither party appears, as yet, fully to realize the state in which their separation has actually placed them, with respect to each other; nor indeed can it be expected, that men, so lately connected by the same bonds of law, loyalty, faith, and blood, should at once bring themselves, to regard each other, in the light of aliens, strangers, and foreigners, whose future connections, and intercourse, are to be regulated, and governed by interest only; and that they have no longer, any rightful claim on each other, for commercial privileges, or advantages of any kind, or nature whatsoever. -Hence it is, that the proclamation, restricting the commerce between the United States, and the British West-Indies, to British subjects, and British ships, has been regarded in America, as an act of partiality, and even injustice, though without that act, no commerce could have taken place, between the two countries, in the state, in which, their final separation, necessarily left them; And in which, (like as with individuals, who are strangers to, and unconnected with each other,) their trade and intercourse, must originate, solely from the wants, the superfluities, and the interests of both parties. –Several publications, have appeared within the last twelvemonths, on the trade of Great-Britain, and her West-India Islands, with the United States, and on the terms, and conditions, by which it ought to be regulated, and able writers have taken opposite sides, on the question, but it appears to me, that it has not been placed in its true point of light, or justly, and impartially stated, by any of them, though the public are indebted to their discussion, for much, and useful information, on this important subject; the principal arguments of both parties, have been too much in this stile, we can better dispense, with your trade, and commerce, than you can do without ours. But commerce between individuals, or nations, is not to be regulated, by a principle or motive, like this, but by apparent, or real mutual interests. The principal questions on this subject, appear to me, to be; How far it is for the interests of Great-Britain, to indulge the United States, with their former privileges of trade, with the British West-Indies, and to permit ships built, and owned in the United States, to be purchased or freighted, by British subjects, in British ports; there are indeed, several other points in question, but these two are the most important, and on them, opposite opinions, have been advanced. On the one hand, the strenuous supporters, of the navigation act, say, that no alteration, or repeal of any part of it, ought to take place, and consequently, that the subjects of the United States cannot, consistently with the interests of Great-Britain, be permitted to trade, with her West-India islands, or with any of her foreign possessions, in their own ships; and that ships built, or owned in the United States, shall not be admitted for sale, or freight, in any of the British ports; on the other, it is said, by those, interested in the West-India plantations, and in that trade, and by many who are engaged in, or acquainted with, the commerce between Great-Britain, and the United States, that the local situation, and circumstances of the West-India islands, are such, as to render it essentially, for their interest, and ultimately, for the interest of the whole empire, to grant to the United States, a free, and unrestricted commerce with them; and that to permit ships, built, or owned in the United States, to be purchased, or freighted, in British ports, will not prejudice, but greatly promote, the commercial interests of this nation. The facts adduced, and the arguments urged, in the support of their different opinions, are before the public, and it is not my intention, to attempt, an examination of them, but only to make a few observations, which may lead to the adopting of a mean, between these two extremes. And it ought to be observed, that in a negotiation, for regulating the commercial intercourse of the two countries, (the British dominions, and the United States), one party, has no claim whatever, on the other, and that interest alone, must dictate; and, therefore, that previous to the forming of any decisive opinion, or to the coming, to any final resolution, on the subject, the particular, as well as the general situation, and interests, of both, ought to be impartially examined, and stated. It is well known, that the United States, produce a surplus of provisions, of every kind, as also of horses, lumber, and a variety of other articles, for which, no market can be found, equally near, and favorable, with that which the West-India islands afford, and that in return, the United States, are in want of the production of the islands, to the full amount of their exports to them, and in particular, of rum from the British West-Indies, which article is not to be had, at present, in any quantity, and of a tolerable quality, from any other quarter; And altho’ it has been asserted, that the British West-Indies, may be supplied, with the articles, former furnished by the United States, from Great-Britain, Ireland, and the remaining British Colonies; yet it has not been denied, by any writer on the subject, that the West-India islands, by means of a free trade with the United States, for provision, horses, cattle, lumber, &c., will be much more regularly, and constantly supplied, and at a cheaper rate, than what they can be, if that trade is prohibited, or too closely restricted; nor has it been pretended by any one, that the West-India islands, can find in any other country, so extenseive and advantageous a market, for their rum, as in the United States. –Thus far, mutual wants, and mutual advantages, in supplying the demands, of each other, are indisputably in favour, of as free a commercial intercourse, between the United States, and the British West-Indies, as can be permitted by Great-Britain, consistent with the general interest, of the nation. But besides the articles of the produce, of the United States, wanted in the islands, they have also raw materials, to a large amount, which in the present state, of the population, of the Continent, cannot be manufactured by them, to advantage; a foreign market is therefore to be sought for, and this can be found, only in manufacturing countries”.-In return, the United States, are in want, of the manufactures, of foreign countries, to a much larger amount, than the value of the raw materials, which they have to send abroad; their demand is nearly for the value of two millions sterl. annually, and this demand is increasing.

Great-Britain, being the first manufacturing, and commercial nation in the world, can give the United States, the best market, for their raw materials, and supply them on the best terms, with the foreign merchandize, and manufactures wanted by them; and experience shews that the Americans prefer the British markets, and manufactures to all others; and on the part of Great-Britain, every foreign market, for her manufactures, is of importance, in proportion to its demand, and to the value of the raw materials received in return; these circumstances naturally lead to the establishing of a trade between the two countries, on the most rational and permanent principle, that of mutual interest. It is undoubtedly true, that Great-Britain, and her West-India islands may, by adopting of certain measures, and suffering some temporary inconveniencies, be supplied with the articles formerly received from the United States, from other countries, and to permit the United States, to supply them with those articles, in their own ships, and to enjoy a certain part of the commercial privileges, formerly enjoyed by them, under the British Government, will be a violation of the navigation act, and of some other acts of Parliament; -but it is equally certain, that without some privileges of commerce, with Great-Britain, and with her West-India Islands, the United States cannot pay for this amount of British goods, and manufactures, and although they prefer them, to those of any other country, yet without the means of paying for them, they must discontinue, or greatly lessen their consumption. But is it not for the interest of Great-Britain, to retain a market, which annually calls for near two millions, in value, of her manufactures? –It has been said, that there is no danger on this account, for that other markets may be found, but is it not good policy, for a manufacturing country, to increase the number of its markets, rather than simply to exchange one, for another, of equal importance? – The superior quality of most of the British manufactures, may command a market for them in every country, which has the means of paying for them, but it is but too probable, if the present restrictions are continued, that the merchants in the United States, will not be able, for some years to come, to pay even for the goods imported by them during the last twelve months only; -If the British West-Indies can be supplied from Great-Britain, and Ireland, and the remaining British possessions, in America, or indeed from any other country, with the articles, formerly sent them, from the United States, as regularly, and at as cheap a rate, as they heretofore had them; -and if those who supply them, will take in exchange, that quantity of rum, formerly consumed in the United States, it is evident, that the West-India planters and merchants can have nothing to complain about on this subject; but these are questions not yet decided, and the situation of the West-India estates, is such, as to render the experiment extremely hazardous. On the part of the United States, it is urged, that, as British ships are permitted, to enter their ports, with the produce, manufactures, and merchandize of Great-Britain, and of Ireland, their ships have an equitable claim, to the same privileges, in the British, and that the same intercourse ought to be permitted between them, and the British West-India islands; the navigation act directly, and wholly forbids this, but the late proclamations, suspending in part, the operation of that act, with respect to the United States, admits the first part of this demand, in every article, except that of oil only, and rejects the latter, by confining the trade, between the United States and the British West-Indies, to British built ships, owned, and navigated, as the act prescribes, by British subjects. –On the part of Great-Britain, the question appears to me, to be, if it is not more for the interest, of her commerce, and manufactures, to permit the Americans, to be their own carriers, to and from the West-India islands, and every other part of her European and American dominions and to sell their ships, or to take freights, in British ports, than by a rigid adherence, to the letter of the navigation act, to expose her West-India subjects to great inconveniences, and real losses, and deprive her merchants, and manufacturers, of a great part at least of a large, and increasing demand, for their goods. It has been repeatedly demanded, what the United States can give, in return, to Great-Britain, for such a relaxation of the navigation act, in their favour, and it must be acknowledged, that the United States, by their treaties with France, and Holland, cannot grant to Great-Britain, or to any other nation, any exclusive privileges: but the subjects of the United States, being at liberty, to prefer the markets, and manufactures, of one country, to those of another, and as they naturally will give the preference, to the British, if they are not prevented by acts, and laws, from carrying their produce freely to those markets, and thereby become deprived of a great part of the means of paying for those manufactures, the question then comes to this, if the relaxation of the navigation act, or the privileges urged for, by the Americans, will not ultimately be, as much for the interest of Great-Britain, as for that of the United States, and if on examination, this shall, (as I think it will) be found to be the case, then it is clear, that Great-Britain can have no demand, upon the Americans, for any thing in return, for measures, as much for her interest as for theirs. It would require a large volume to discuss this subject, as fully as it merits, I shall therefore only observe, that as in the management and regulation of the trade, and commercial intercourse of the two countries, with each other, motives of interest alone must govern, so each of them, ought to examine, with the utmost attention, and impartiality, what on the whole is most for the general interest, of the respective countries, and not to confine themselves, to particular branches, or to partial views.

If on the enquiry, it appear to be inconsistent with the general interest of Great-Britain to permit the Americans to purchase, and export from her West-Indies certain articles of their produce, for instance, sugar, or cotton, or indigo, they will be expected, in the general permission, and the same principle, must necessarily be adopted by the United States. –This can afford no just grounds for complaint, on either side. Sugar, cotton, and indigo, are almost the only articles of West-India Produce, which Great-Britain can with to make a monopoly of –the United States are in no want of indigo, and their consumption of cotton, has ever been inconsiderable, and it is agreed by all the writers on this subject, that the Americans can purchase sugar much cheaper in the French, Dutch and Danish Islands, than in those of the English. The articles of salted beef, butter, tallow, and candles, may be sent to the West-Indies, at a lower rate from Ireland, than from the United States; hence it appears to me, that if an entirely free, and unlimited commerce between the United States, and those Islands cannot be permitted, consistent with the general interest of Great-Britain yet it is not a very difficult task to regulate it, in such a manner, as to be agreeable, and advantageous, to both countries.

The principal objection to such a system, is, that hereby Great-Britain, must loose, and the United States gain, in the carrying business; on this Lord Sheffield has forcibly argued, in his Observations, on the Commerce of the American States. Though I must candidly declare, that, as far as my knowledge extends, the facts advanced by his Lordship, in that publication, relative to the imports, and exports of the United States, are justly stated, yet I can by no means subscribe to all the inferences, and conclusions, which he draws from them. But were I to enter on this subject, I should swell, what is designed to be but a small pamphlet published in my personal vindication, into a large volume; I shall therefore only observe generally here, what I have repeatedly urged in conversation with the noble Lord, and there is not the least danger, of the United States, becoming the rivals, of Great-Britain, in the carrying trade, or in a marine; -That although building ships for sale, and for carrying the goods of other countries, and for the fisheries, was the principal resource of one, or two, (at most,) of the northern states, yet the United States collectively, never were their own carriers; for though the New-England States, carried their own produce, in ships built and navigated by their own people, and in some instances, became carriers for other countries; yet that was not the case, with any of the middle, or of the southern States. The tobacco, naval stores, rice, indigo, lumber, and other productions of the middle and southern States, required by three times more tons of shipping, than was ever owned by them, or that could, at any period, have been put into that business, by the northern States; and that it is not possible, at least in the natural course of things, that the southern States, can for ages, if ever, become carriers even of their own produce; and that it must require some space of time, for the northern States, to have a sufficiency of shipping, even to answer this demand; -farther I have urged, that, as every one, who has wares, or merchandize to be transported to market, will naturally prefer the most cheap, and direct conveyance, and as the purchasers will attend only to the quality, and price of them, this branch of commerce, like all others, must and will, regulate itself by the infallible principle of interest, rightly understood; and it may be worthy of observation, that if the United States are not permitted to be their own carriers between them, and the West Indies, on the presumption, that this would encourage the carrying trade, and encrease the marine of the northern States, to the prejudice of that of Great-Britain; The consequence will be, that the New-England States, will turn their attention, to the carrying business of Maryland, Virginia, and of the other southern States, and by engrossing of it, more than make themselves amends, for their loss of freight to, and from the British West-Indies.

I may be told, that my present observations, are in part of them, different from those contained in the foregoing letter, for that I then gave it, as my opinion, that in consequence of the confirmation, of the independence of the United States, and of their final separation from Great-Britain, Great-Britain would necessarily exclude the ships of the United States from her West-India ports; but it ought to be remembered, that at the date of that letter, it was universally expected, that at the close of the war, the two Florida’s, and East-Louisiana, would be confirmed to Great-Britain; and that the resigning of those countries to Spain, makes the case extremely different, from what it would have been, had Great-Britain retained them; and that I meant, in writing to Mr. Morris, to lay before him, not only, what would be for the interest of Great-Britain, but also what would be in her power to do, respecting the commerce of the United States.

Finis.

Descriptive Title: Document 30
Description: To The Free and Independent Citizens of the United States of North America
Location: Connecticut Historical Society Museum
Copyright: New-York Historical Society
Author/Creator: Silas Deane
Date Created: 1784
Publisher: New-York Historical Society
Editor: C. Isham
Subject: Deane’s defense of himself to the American People
Reaction: None